Foreign Policy Goals - Analysis of Ernst von Weizsaecker, June 1934
Foreign Policy Goals of Conservative Functionaries - Analysis of Ernst von Weizsaecker, June 1934
Source: W. Michalka (Hg.), Das Dritte Reich, Vol. 1 (Muenchen, 1985), pp. 226-228.
Until 1932 we were in the offensive against the occupation of the Rhineland, reparations, forced disarmament, minority problems, a policy of the Allies with the target of a status-quo. Certain problems were left pending (the corridor to Danzig, the annexation of the Saar region). We had practically renounced the regions of Alsace and Lorraine.
Altogether in the years 1920 - 1932 one could see some progress, even though it was very slow and not always in a straight line. A critical moment was necessarily the time when we called for a decision in the question of disarmament. We are now in this situation. The crisis is not yet over. In order to settle the problem we have set aside the battle against the territorial status quo and in connection to this the problem of the minorities. The result of our position was that at the same time the adverse policy of the Allies in favour of a status quo has intensified. And different otherwise neutral or friendly powers turned against us. We find ourselves in a state of isolation, which is like a blockade in the economic field and like an armed siege in the military sense. We therefore have to focus on what is most pressing – the struggle for the Saar, a fast military armament that will enable us to defend ourselves and at a later stage make us capable of making alliances, and the battle for our economic existence. Everything else has to take second priority. There is hardly any danger of war, as France will only turn its weapons against us in an extreme case. It seems that a certain extent of German armament is being accepted. They wish to contain us with economic restraints…The odds are high. The economic, financial situation is serious. It is influencing our armament. Unforeseeable events can easily ignite the situation. We therefore have to cross the danger zone in which we are faster and more securely…All in all it would be a mistake to believe that we are at the centre of a totally hostile world; there are enough other rivalries we could ensue and use to our advantage.
These more optimistic prospects are now covered with heavy clouds, which are connected to the National Socialist revolution, but can and have to be disseminated. Even once we are past the danger zone, we cannot afford to remain indifferent to sympathies and antipathies of foreign countries, because we then have to take up again the goals we have now put aside and for this we will need a certain forbearance and support on their part.
Practically speaking the French policy of the Alliance drives us more towards the group Italy-Hungary-Austria. Britain too has reasons to seek alliances in Europe. Poland is disoriented and searches for support…We have no political aspirations outside Europe and can therefore count on good will. Why isn't all this in our favour? Why do we live amidst isolation and an atmosphere of near hostility, which can remind one of the times of the World War?
They need rest and fears to disturb the peace. They believe Germany is explosive and fear unexpected developments. They are anxious the inner political circumstances are contagious. Emotionally they reject the treatment of the churches and the racial questions.
Confidence in a constant, uniform, peace seeking German foreign policy can be re-established if all irresponsible persons will be not be permitted to speak and if the apparatus of our foreign service will be permitted in those instances when purely internal measures trespass on foreign policy matters.
A centralised conduct of foreign policy that speaks a quiet, worthy and determined language, will certainly be taken seriously in issues of rearmament and the question of the Saar. Its conciliatory assurances will be trusted and it will be granted the right to defend itself. However this will be coupled with a demand to contribute to international co-operation. We could propose a pact (a substitute to the League of Nations). We would somehow have to liquidate our policy towards Austria.
